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It is said that the core value of American colleges and universities is the existence of an environment free from restraint on
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and students.1 The Supreme Court has echoed this theory, hailing
the university as the quintessential marketplace of ideas.2 American colleges and universities, however, are also charged with the
potentially incompatible task of instilling the values and self-restraint necessary to create productive members of society.3 Over
the past two decades, the desire to balance these tasks has produced a “philosophical furor over whether the group is more important than the individual, whether the sensibilities of minorities
and women should be elevated over the freedom of expression,
and whether ‘equality’ should prevail over robust discourse” in
universities.4
There has been wide-ranging debate concerning freedom of
thought and expression in the university and it has taken many
forms, including concerns about the status of academic freedom,5
allegations of bias in the classroom,6 criticism of and support for
1. See, e.g., Gerard V. Bradley, Religion at a Public University, 49 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 2217, 2257 (2008) (“Academic exchanges operate according to norms of relentless, perpetual inquiry.”); William R. Greiner, Speech in, for, and by(?) the “Multiversity”: Reflections of a Recovering President, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 863, 871 (2006)
(examining John Henry Cardinal Newman’s The Idea of a University, in 28 HARV.
CLASSICS 31, 39 (Charles W. Eliot ed., 1910), and summarizing that today’s university
“is and must be a free and open forum in which its people can engage in an unfettered
search for knowledge, wherever that may lead”); see also David van Mill, Freedom of
Speech, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Winter
ed. 2002), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2002/entries/freedom-speech/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2008) (noting that one of the main values of the university is the exchange of ideas).
2. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1972) (“The college classroom
with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas,’ and we break no
new constitutional ground in reaffirming this Nation’s dedication to safeguarding academic freedom.”). The rationale for the marketplace metaphor, no doubt familiar to
students and scholars of the First Amendment, rests on the idea “that the ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .”
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
3. See Virginia J. Nimick, Schoolhouse Rocked: Hosty v. Carter and the Case
against Hazelwood, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 941, 942 (2006); see also Papish v. Bd. of Curators
of the Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 672 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (noting that “a
university is not merely an arena for the discussion of ideas . . . [but] is also an institution where [students] learn the self-restraint necessary to the functioning of a civilized
society and understand the need for those external restraints to which we must all
submit if group existence is to be tolerable”).
4. Kenneth Lasson, Political Correctness Askew: Excesses in the Pursuit of Minds
and Manners, 63 TENN. L. REV. 689, 691 (1996).
5. See Neil W. Hamilton, Foreword: Symposium on Zealotry and Academic Freedom, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 333 (1996).
6. See Robert M. O’Neil, Bias, “Balance,” and Beyond: New Threats to Academic Freedom, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 985 (2006).
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political correctness,7 and arguments over the development and use
of hate speech codes.8 Despite this scholarly debate, the issue of
college student speech9 has been played out and decided in the
courts.10 Since 1972, the Supreme Court has decided a number of
cases dealing with the speech rights of college students.11 These
precedents have repeatedly upheld the free speech rights of students and student organizations.12 Commentators see the precedent as sending a “clear message that the First Amendment
[cannot] be avoided or watered down in the university context,
[and that the] rights of college students [are equal to] those of the
adult population at large.”13

7. See Lasson, supra note 4, at 718-21.
8. See generally TIMOTHY C. SHIELL, CAMPUS HATE SPEECH ON TRIAL (1998).
9. There are different types of speech on college and university campuses, each
with its own regulations. See AM. ASS’N UNIV. PROFESSORS, DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES (1915), reprinted in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE app. A, at 157-76
(Louis Joughin ed., 1967) (emphasizing the crucial function in allowing professors to
engage in their socially valuable search for truth free from political or other external
constraints, as professors are supposed to be impartial experts progressively gaining
objective knowledge); Greiner, supra note 1, at 869 (arguing that speech by university
administrative officials—for example, university presidents—is speech of the university and, as such, is to be regulated accordingly; such agents “can speak with authority
. . . on matters regarding university governance, management, and fundamental principles, but beyond that the university has little or no institutional competence to take
positions on other matters”).
10. See discussion infra Parts I-II.
11. See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217
(2000); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Papish v. Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo.,
410 U.S. 667 (1973); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
12. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 233-34 (upholding the university’s right to use a
mandatory activity fee to subsidize all student groups, even ones with goals and purposes with which students may disagree); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 843-45 (upholding
the right of a Christian student group to receive funding for printing from the university, where the university had a general policy of paying such costs for student
groups); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265, 277 (finding that the university discriminated
wrongly against a religious student group by denying it access to university buildings
and grounds to conduct its meetings, even though that group previously had permission and other groups still had permission); Papish, 410 U.S. at 671 (finding that a
university’s actions in expelling a student for distributing an independent newspaper
containing offensive political material could not be justified under the First Amendment); Healy, 408 U.S. at 184 (finding a university’s denial of recognition to a student
group was a form of prior restraint and imposing a heavy burden on the university to
justify such restraint).
13. Michael O. Finnigan, Jr., Extra! Extra! Read All About It! Censorship at State
Universities, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1477, 1482 (2006).
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The Supreme Court has also decided a line of cases dealing with
high school student speech rights.14 These cases are often seen as
distinct from the Court’s college speech jurisprudence15 and they
apply a more restrictive framework to evaluate student speech.16
Unlike the college speech jurisprudence, the Court has consistently
upheld the ability of primary and secondary schools to regulate student expression.17
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier18 was one of the more
recent decisions in the Court’s line of high school speech cases. In
this case, the Court evaluated the administrative control of a high
school newspaper and held that public school officials could control speech in school-sponsored activities if they did so for legitimate pedagogical reasons.19 While the Court reserved the question
of whether this standard should be applicable at the university
level,20 various federal circuit courts have since applied this speechrestrictive standard to student speech at colleges and universities.21
In light of these circuit court opinions, there has been considerable debate about whether and to what extent the Hazelwood
framework should apply to college and university students.22 Most
14. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675
(1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
15. See Nimick, supra note 3, at 982-83 (noting that the Supreme Court has regularly highlighted the distinction between the constitutional rights of high school students and those of college students).
16. See, e.g., Finnigan, supra note 13, at 1494 (noting the reasons why the Supreme
Court has allowed greater restrictions on speech in the high school environment).
17. See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2625 (upholding the right of a high school to punish a
student who unfurled a banner displaying “Bong Hits for Jesus” during a procession
of the Olympic torch); Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272 (upholding the right of a school to
require a student newspaper to submit to prior review of the paper by school personnel before it is printed); Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685 (upholding a high school’s suspension
of a student who gave a speech, that the Court described as an elaborate, graphic, and
sexual metaphor, before a student assembly).
18. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 260.
19. See id. at 273.
20. See id. at 273 n.7.
21. See discussion infra Part II.A.
22. See Louis M. Benedict, The First Amendment and College Student Newspapers:
Applying Hazelwood to Colleges and Universities, 33 J.C. & U.L. 245 (2007); Edward
L. Carter et al., Applying Hazelwood to College Speech: Forum Doctrine and Government Speech in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 157, 160 (2006); Finnigan, supra note 13; Jessica Golby, The Case Against Extending Hazelwood v.
Kuhlmeier’s Public Forum Analysis to the Regulation of University Student Speech, 84
WASH. U. L. REV. 1263, 1279 (2006); Samuel P. Jordan, Viewpoint Restrictions and
School-Sponsored Student Speech: Avenues for Heightened Protection, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1555, 1566 (2003); Karyl Roberts Martin, Demoted to High School: Are College
Students’ Free Speech Rights the Same as Those of High School Students?, 45 B.C. L.
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scholars have concluded, for various reasons, that the more speechrestrictive standard that the Supreme Court applied to high school
students in Hazelwood should not apply to university students.23
This criticism reached fever pitch following a recent decision of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,24 in which the Hazelwood framework was applied to a university mandate that a student newspaper submit to the prior review and approval of
university officials before publication.25
Critics argue that the application of Hazelwood to universities
goes against Supreme Court precedent and recommend that circuit
judges heed the distinction between high school and college student speech until the Supreme Court resolves the matter.26 This
REV. 173 (2003); Laura Merritt, How the Hosty Court Muddled First Amendment Protections by Misapplying Hazelwood to University Student Speech, 33 J.C. & U.L. 473,
493-94 (2007); Nimick, supra note 3; Richard J. Peltz, Censorship Tsunami Spares
College Media: To Protect Free Expression on Public Campuses, Lessons from the
“College Hazelwood” Case, 68 TENN. L. REV. 481, 482 (2001); Jennifer Ross, Keeping
Speech Free in the College Marketplace of Ideas: California Legislation as an Imperfect Solution to Censorship by University Administrators, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 727 (2007);
Chris Sanders, Censorship 101: Anti-Hazelwood Laws and the Preservation of Free
Speech at Colleges and Universities, 58 ALA. L. REV. 159 (2006); Greg C. Tenhoff,
Censoring the Public University Student Press: A Constitutional Challenge, 64 S. CAL.
L. REV. 511 (1991); R. George Wright, The Emergence of First Amendment Academic
Freedom, 85 NEB. L. REV. 793 (2007); R. George Wright, School-Sponsored Speech
and the Surprising Case for Viewpoint-Based Regulations, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 175, 198
(2007).
23. See Nimick, supra note 3, at 982-85 (arguing that the Hazelwood test should
not be applicable in the university setting due to the different age and maturity levels
of students and due to the different missions of high schools and colleges); infra notes
160-63 and accompanying text.
24. Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005).
25. See, e.g., Finnigan, supra note 13, at 1492-96 (explaining various reasons why
Hosty was wrongly decided); Nimick, supra note 3 (setting forth several arguments
questioning the ruling in Hosty).
26. See Carter, supra note 22, at 182 (concluding that whether applications of Hazelwood to the university context are correct awaits another Supreme Court pronouncement and that, in the meantime, jurists should consider whether the analogy of
university students to their high school counterparts is justified in light of real differences in maturity levels and expectations of high school and college students); Finnigan, supra note 13, at 1496 (concluding that applying Hazelwood to speech in the
university context represents a significant departure from established First Amendment rights of college students, and that the Supreme Court erred by denying certiorari to the Seventh Circuit’s application of Hazelwood to college student expression in
Hosty, 412 F.3d 731); Golby, supra note 22, at 1286 (noting that applying Hazelwood
to colleges ignores the significant distinctions the Supreme Court has consistently recognized between high school and college student expression and proposing judicial
tests that provide clear standards and protect the long tradition of the university as a
“marketplace of ideas”); Jordan, supra note 22, at 1579 (recommending two alternative judicial tests to the Hazelwood framework that would better protect student
speech); Merritt, supra note 22, at 496-97 (noting that application of Hazelwood to

R
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Note argues that, while the Supreme Court’s decisions in the college context have been protective of students’ free speech rights,
there are similarities between the Hazelwood opinion and the
Court’s recent university speech decisions that have increasingly
recognized the power of university officials to regulate student
expression.
Those who criticize the application of Hazelwood to college student speech rely primarily on two of the Court’s early college student speech decisions for the notion that college student speech
rights are the same as those of adults in the community at large.
The problem with this reliance is that, while those early cases do
not justify the application of Hazelwood to the college context, the
Court has decided several recent cases by applying virtually the
same test to analyze college student speech that the courts of appeals have been applying since Hazelwood. Thus, the circuit
courts’ application of Hazelwood to college student speech cannot
be considered wrong in the sense that they are departing from the
Supreme Court’s view of college student speech rights. In light of
this, the Hazelwood framework remains applicable to university
student speech in a majority of circuits, and those circuits that have
not heard the issue are likely to follow suit and apply Hazelwood in
the university context. Student free speech advocates, then, should
consider extrajudicial remedies if they wish to ensure increased
protection for students’ freedom of expression in colleges and
universities.
Part I of this Note examines the Supreme Court’s line of college
student speech cases and its decision in Hazelwood School District
v. Kuhlmeier. Part II explores several important circuit court decisions that have applied Hazelwood to cases involving university
student speech. Part III evaluates scholarly reaction to these circuit decisions, including the claim that the application of Hazelwood to the university context departs from well-established
colleges breaks with a long tradition of Supreme Court protection of First Amendment rights of college and university students and recommending, in the absence of a
Supreme Court grant of certiorari, that future courts should recognize the flaws in
applying Hazelwood to university settings and recognize the broad First Amendment
protections that university students have historically enjoyed); Nimick, supra note 3,
at 996 (arguing that applying Hazelwood to student speech in the university overrules
more than thirty years of First Amendment jurisprudence and ignores differences in
age and maturity levels of high school and college students and the different missions
of high schools and colleges, while recommending that courts limit Hazelwood to the
high school setting); Peltz, supra note 22, at 555 (recommending various avenues students can pursue in court, to avoid further extension of the Hazelwood doctrine to
college student speech).

R
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precedent granting college students broad free speech rights. Part
IV argues that the application of Hazelwood to college student
speech is actually supported by recent Supreme Court decisions
and that there is good reason to believe other courts considering
the issue will also apply Hazelwood’s principles. This Note concludes that the federal courts may not be the best place for student
free speech proponents to look if they wish to uphold and expand
student speech rights, and recommends that they consider looking
elsewhere for relief.
I.

SUPREME COURT UNIVERSITY SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE
A.

Early Cases

In 1972, the Supreme Court decided Healy v. James,27 and found
that Central Connecticut State College violated the First Amendment rights of students who wanted to form a local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society (“SDS”) by denying the group
recognition as a campus organization.28 The late 1960s and early
1970s were characterized by a climate of unrest on many college
campuses, during which SDS chapters across American campuses
served as a “catalytic force.”29 In light of this, the president of the
college denied official recognition to a proposed SDS chapter on
Central Connecticut’s campus, stating that he found the organization’s philosophy “antithetical to the school’s policies,” and that he
doubted this local chapter would be independent from the infamous national chapter (reflecting his fear that the local chapter
would adopt the disruptive practices of other chapters).30
The Court found that “colleges and universities are not enclaves
immune from the sweep of the First Amendment,” and that the
First Amendment protections afforded college students should
comport with those in the community at large.31 The Court noted
that the “college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas’” and that the principle of academic freedom should be safeguarded.32 Specifically, the Court
held that once a student group filed a proper application for campus recognition, the burden was placed on the college to justify its
27. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
28. See id. at 187.
29. See id. at 171.
30. See id. at 174-75.
31. See id. at 180.
32. See id. at 180-81 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967)).
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decision of rejection.33 Noting that the college’s action denying
SDS recognition was a form of prior restraint,34 the Court found a
heavy burden rested on the college to demonstrate the appropriateness of their action.35
This heavy burden might be met, however, by a college’s legitimate interest in preventing disruption on campus.36 The Court acknowledged the duty of schools to balance the need for First
Amendment protections with the comprehensive authority of
school officials to prescribe and control conduct, to maintain order
within the school.37 Accordingly, the Court reasoned that a college
“may have, among its requirements for recognition, a rule that prospective groups affirm that they intend to comply with reasonable
campus regulations.”38
A year after Healy, the Court decided Papish v. Board of Curators of the University of Missouri, a case involving the expulsion of
a graduate student from the University of Missouri School of Journalism for distributing an outside private newspaper “containing
forms of indecent speech” in violation of university bylaws.39 The
cover of the newspaper showed a political cartoon depicting policemen raping the Statue of Liberty and Goddess of Justice, with a
caption underneath which read, “With Liberty and Justice for
All.”40 The paper also included a story entitled “M—-F—- Acquitted,” which discussed the trial of a city youth who was a member of
an organization known as “Up Against the Wall, M—-F—-.”41
In a per curiam opinion, the Court found that while schools have
an undoubted authority to enforce reasonable rules governing student conduct, the mere dissemination of ideas, no matter how offensive, may not be shut off in the name of “conventions of
decency.”42 After determining that neither the political cartoon
33. See id. at 184.
34. “Prior restraint” refers only to distinctive methods of regulating expression. A
classic example of a prior restraint is a law that forces newspapers to obtain preapproval from the government before any publication. See Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S.
444, 451-52 (1972) (finding an ordinance prohibiting the distribution of handbooks,
advertising, or literature within the city of Griffin, Georgia, without obtaining permission of the City Manager to be invalid on its face as an unreasonable form of prior
restraint); supra text accompanying note 25.
35. See Healy, 408 U.S. at 184.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 180.
38. Id. at 193.
39. 410 U.S. 667 (1973).
40. Id. at 667.
41. See id. at 667-68.
42. See id. at 670.
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nor the headline story involved in the case could be labeled as constitutionally obscene or otherwise unprotected, the Court found
that the university’s actions in expelling the student were clearly
motivated by the content of the newspaper43 and could not be justified as a nondiscriminatory application of reasonable campus
regulations.44
B.

Later Cases: The Forum Analysis

Almost a decade after Healy, in Widmar v. Vincent,45 the Court
heard a case brought by members of a registered religious group
against the University of Missouri at Kansas City challenging a university regulation prohibiting the use of university buildings or
grounds “for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching.”46
The group had previously gained permission to conduct its meetings on campus, but was later informed it could no longer do so
pursuant to university policy.47 Members of the group alleged that
the regulation violated their rights to free exercise of religion and
freedom of speech under the First Amendment.48
Recognizing that the First Amendment rights of college students
are not automatically the same as the rights of adults elsewhere,
the Court undertook an analysis of the type of forum in which the
student expression at issue took place. This “forum analysis” was
most clearly delineated in Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’ Association.49 The forum analysis evaluates regulation of otherwise constitutionally protected speech depending on
the type of expressive venue, or forum, involved and the forum’s
intended purpose.50 The Court, in Perry, detailed three different
forum classifications for evaluating government regulation under
the First Amendment: 1) the traditional public forum; 2) the lim43. Content-based speech regulations are presumptively invalid. See, e.g., R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
44. See Papish, 410 U.S. at 670.
45. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
46. See id. at 265.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 266.
49. 460 U.S. 37 (1983). In Perry, the Court found that high school teachers’ mailboxes are non-public forums, and it was thus reasonable for the school district to
prohibit rivals of the exclusive district union from having access to the mailboxes. See
id. at 53-55.
50. This forum analysis is applied in and outside of the school context. In fact, in
the application of the forum analysis, the location where speech takes place determines the nature of the forum. For instance, public streets and sidewalks are considered public forums. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). In contrast, school
mailrooms are considered nonpublic forums. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 47.
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ited, or “designated,” public forum; and 3) the nonpublic forum.51
The traditional public forum consists of those areas of public property that have been open historically to all for communication or
discussion of issues (for example, public streets and parks).52 In
order for a regulation of speech to be upheld in a public forum it
must serve a compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored to
that end.53 The limited public forum is one that has been opened
to the public for a designated purpose or limited to discussion of
certain subjects (for example, university meeting facilities for student groups and municipal theaters).54 In this context, the public
university,55 may determine the content of speech in a limited public forum, but any regulation of speech within that content must be
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.56 Nonpublic forums are those that have not traditionally been opened to the public (for example, United States mailboxes and high school
newspapers) and any regulation that is reasonable and intended to
preserve the purpose of the forum is permissible.57
Applying this forum analysis to the facts in Widmar, the Court
found that, “through its policy of accommodating [the] meetings”
of numerous student groups, “the university [had] created a forum
generally open for use by student groups.”58 While the Court again
recognized that colleges are “peculiarly ‘the marketplace of
ideas,’”59 it also recognized that First Amendment principles must
be applied “in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.”60 The Court noted that
[a] university differs in significant respects from public forums
such as streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A university’s mission is education, and decisions of this Court have
never denied a university’s authority to impose reasonable regu51. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
52. See id. at 45.
53. See id.
54. See id.; see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 829 (1995) (finding that the “necessit[y] of confining a forum to the limited and
legitimate purposes for which it was created may justify” a state’s regulation of that
forum in order to reserve the forum for certain groups or discussion of certain topics).
55. See Bradley, supra note 1 (discussing how the First Amendment, and constitutional norms in general, binds public universities and puts private schools in a different position).
56. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45; supra note 54.
57. Id. See discussion infra Part I.C for the example of a student newspaper as a
nonpublic forum.
58. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981).
59. Id. at 268 n.5 (quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972)).
60. Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
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lations compatible with that mission upon the use of its campus
and facilities.61

With these differences in mind, the Court recognized that colleges
were not required to establish a public forum on their campuses.62
However, since the university had established a public forum,
the Court determined that the university had “discriminated
against student groups and speakers based on their desire to use a
generally open forum to engage in religious worship and discussion.”63 “In order to justify [such] discriminatory exclusion from a
public forum based on the religious content of a group’s . . .
speech,” the university would have to “show that its regulation
[was] necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it [was]
narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”64
The Court agreed that the university’s interest in not violating
the Establishment Clause was compelling, but that having an
“equal access” policy would be compatible with the Court’s Establishment Clause cases.65 The Court found that by creating a forum
generally available to all student groups, the university would not
thereby be endorsing or promoting any of the particular ideas aired
there.66 “The university would [actually] risk greater [constitutional] ‘entanglement’ by attempting to enforce its exclusion of ‘religious worship’ and ‘religious speech.’”67 Thus, the university
could not justify excluding a group based on the religious content
of the group’s speech.
In 1995, another religious student group aired its First Amendment complaints against their university before the Supreme
Court. In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of
Virginia,68 the University of Virginia withheld authorization for reimbursements for printing costs to a student organization, Wide
Awake, which published a Christian newspaper.69 The university
had a policy of paying the printing costs of student publications;
however, it denied funding to Wide Awake for the sole reason that
the student paper was a “religious activity” that “primarily pro61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
See id. at 268.
Id. at 269.
Id. at 269-70.
See id. at 271.
See id. at 272 n.10.
Id. at 272 n.11.
515 U.S. 819 (1995).
See id. at 822.
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motes or manifests a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an
ultimate reality,” in violation of university guidelines.70
The Court again undertook the forum analysis explicated in
Widmar. The Court noted that
‘There is no question that the [school], like the private owner of
property, may legally preserve the property under its control for
the use to which it is dedicated.’ . . . The necessities of confining
a forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was
created may justify . . . reserving it for certain groups or for the
discussion of certain topics.71

However, once a limited forum has been opened, the school “must
respect the lawful boundaries it has itself set.”72 Speech may not
be excluded where its distinction from other types of allowable
speech is not “reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.”73 In determining whether the exclusion of speech is legitimate, the Court observed a “distinction between . . . content
discrimination, which [is] permissible if it preserves the purposes of
[the] limited forum, and . . . viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed impermissible when directed against speech otherwise
within the forum’s limitations.”74
According to the Court, this forum analysis is not the only important principle to emerge from Widmar. The Court found that
Widmar also stood for the principle that when the State is the
speaker—i.e., when it appropriates public funds, in this case to
fund a state university, to promote a particular policy—it may
make content-based choices.75 Thus, “[w]hen the University determines the content of the education it provides, it is the University
speaking” and it is permitted to regulate what is or is not expressed
accordingly.76
Taking this into account, the Court found that the University of
Virginia was not using its funds to subsidize a message of its own,
but instead to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers.77 This distinction is subtle, but important. If the Court had
found that the state’s funding of the University of Virginia was be70. Id. at 825.
71. Id. at 829 (quoting Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384, 390 (1993).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 829-30; see supra note 54 and accompanying text.
75. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 834.

R
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ing used to promote a particular policy (in this case, the policy of
non-sponsorship of religion),78 then the Court could have allowed
the university to regulate the content of the student journals in furtherance of that policy.79 The Court did not find this, but instead
found that the university was appropriating its funds to create an
open forum.80 Thus, the university had to adhere to the principle
that regulations of speech in an open forum must be content neutral unless some content-based restriction is necessary to serve a
compelling governmental interest.81
In light of this, the Court determined that the university had engaged in unlawful viewpoint discrimination.82 The university’s prohibition against funding religious activities did not exclude religion
as a subject matter, but selected “for disfavored treatment those
student journalistic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints.”83
Since the university provided funds for other student journals, they
had to provide funds to Wide Awake.84
Five years after the Court decided Rosenberger, it ruled on another free speech claim brought by a group of college students. In
Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth,85 students at the University of Wisconsin brought a First
Amendment challenge to a mandatory student activity fee imposed
by the university to support student organizations engaging in political or ideological speech.86 The students objected to the speech
and expression of some of the student organizations and claimed
they could not be required to pay for, and subsidize, such speech.87
The Court again applied the public forum analysis explicated in
Widmar and Rosenberger.88 Noting that the university had dis78. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
79. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 (“When the University determines the content of the education it provides, it is the University speaking, and we have permitted
the government to regulate the content of what is or is not expressed when it is the
speaker or when it enlists private entities to convey its own message.”); supra notes
75-76 and accompanying text.
80. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834 (“[W]e did not suggest in Widmar[ ] that
viewpoint-based restrictions are proper when the University does not itself speak or
subsidize transmittal of a message it favors but instead expends funds to encourage a
diversity of views from private speakers.”).
81. See id.; see also supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
82. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 840.
85. 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
86. See id. at 221.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 230.

R
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claimed that the speech was its own, the Court found that this was
not a case where recognition need be given to a university’s ability
to control the content of its own speech or the speech it was subsidizing through some student group or other party.89 As was the
case in Widmar and Rosenberger, the Court found that the purpose
of the forum created by the mandatory student activity fee was to
facilitate the free and open exchange of ideas by and among its
students: “The speech the University seeks to encourage in the
program before us is distinguished not by discernable limits but by
its vast, unexplored bounds. To insist upon asking what speech is
germane would be contrary to the very goal the University seeks to
pursue.”90
The Court left such a decision to the university, allowing for a
university to adopt some other system to determine students’ First
Amendment rights if it decided to do so.91 “The University may
determine that its mission is well served if students have the means
to engage in dynamic discussions of philosophical, religious, scientific, social and political subjects in their extracurricular campus life
outside the lecture hall.”92 If it does so, the Court held, the university is entitled to impose a mandatory fee to sustain an open dialogue to these ends.93
The Court ended its decision by warning that it not be taken to
imply that in other instances the university, its agents, or its faculty
are subject to the analysis used to decide this case.94 Where the
university speaks, such as to promote its own policies or to advance
a particular idea, “the analysis likely would be altogether
different.”95
C.

The Hazelwood Decision

The scholarly criticism discussed in Part III of this Note stems
from subsequent applications of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.96 Hazelwood was a high
89. See id.; supra note 80 and accompanying text; cf. notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
90. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 230, 232.
91. See id. at 232.
92. Id. at 233.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 235.
95. Id. For the analysis to be used in this instance, see supra notes 75-76, 78-80 and
accompanying text.
96. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).

R
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school speech case that was decided between the Court’s decisions
in Widmar and Rosenberger.97
The plaintiffs in Hazelwood were student staff members of a
high school newspaper who argued that their school violated their
First Amendment rights by deleting two pages of articles from an
issue of the newspaper.98 The newspaper at issue was written and
edited as part of a journalism class the high school offered and was
funded by the school board.99
The practice of the newspaper was for the journalism teacher to
submit page proofs of each issue to the principal for review prior to
publication.100 On one such occasion, the principal objected to two
of the articles that were to appear in a particular issue: one dealt
with three unnamed students’ experiences with pregnancy and the
other discussed the impact of divorce on students at the school.101
The principal believed that there was no time to make the necessary changes in the stories before the scheduled press run and concluded that his only options were to eliminate the two pages on
which the offending stories appeared or to publish no newspaper at
all.102 The student staff members then sued seeking a declaration
that the school violated their First Amendment rights.
Applying the forum analysis explicated in Perry,103 the Court
concluded that school facilities may be deemed public forums only
if school authorities have by policy or practice opened those facilities for indiscriminate use by the general public.104 Since the newspaper was part of a class curriculum, and due to the practice of
supervision by school officials over the paper, the Court concluded
that the newspaper was a nonpublic forum reserved for its intended purpose as a learning experience for journalism students.105
Accordingly, the Court held that school officials were entitled to
regulate the newspaper in any reasonable manner.106 The Court
noted that this decision dealt with “expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.”107 The Court
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Widmar was decided in 1981, Hazelwood in 1988, and Rosenberger in 1995.
See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 262.
See id.
See id. at 263.
See id.
See id. at 263-64.
See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267.
See id. at 270.
See id.
Id. at 281.

R
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concluded that “educators do not offend the First Amendment by
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”108
In a footnote that has caused an avalanche of debate and controversy,109 the Court refused to decide “whether the same degree of
deference is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and university level.”110
II.

SUBSEQUENT APPLICATIONS OF HAZELWOOD
STUDENT SPEECH

TO

COLLEGE

Since Hazelwood, the federal circuit courts have grappled with
the issue of whether the principles in the decision should be applied at the university level. Only the First Circuit has expressly
held that Hazelwood does not apply to student speech in the college and university setting.111 On the other hand, seven federal circuit panels have applied Hazelwood in some fashion to college
student speech.112
A.

Circuit Courts Applying Hazelwood to the
University Context

In Alabama Student Party v. Student Government Association of
the University of Alabama,113 the Eleventh Circuit heard a case
brought by students at the University of Alabama challenging, on
First Amendment grounds, university regulations that imposed limits on campaign expenditures of students interested in running for
positions on the Student Government Association.114 Noting the
deference courts give to the educational missions of universities,
the court applied Hazelwood in finding that educators have the
right to control school-related speech so long as their actions are
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.115 Applying
108. Id. at 273.
109. See discussion infra Parts II, III.
110. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 n.7.
111. See Student Gov’t Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 473 (1st
Cir. 1989).
112. See Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 2007); Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d
731 (7th Cir. 2005); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004); Brown v.
Li, 308 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002); Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001);
Cummins v. Campbell, 44 F.3d 847 (10th Cir. 1994); Ala. Student Party v. Student
Gov’t Ass’n of the Univ. of Ala., 867 F.2d 1344 (11th Cir. 1989).
113. 867 F.2d at 1344.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 1346.
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this standard, the court upheld the university regulations, finding
that student government campaigns do not constitute a forum generally open to the public, but one reserved for the creation of “a
supervised learning experience for students interested in politics
and government.”116 Student campaign expenditures constituted a
form of school-sponsored speech that could be regulated pursuant
to the university’s legitimate pedagogical interest in minimizing the
disruptive effect of campus electioneering.117
In Cummins v. Campbell,118 members of the Ohio State University Student Union alleged that the university unlawfully engaged
in a form of prior restraint by determining that the student group
could not show the controversial film The Last Temptation of
Christ until it got approval from the university president and legal
counsel.119 The Tenth Circuit applied Hazelwood, finding that the
Student Union Activities Board (SUAB) was sponsored by the university.120 In particular, the court found that the student activities
board appeared to be an agent or extension of Ohio State University (OSU), given that it received student fees from OSU’s coffers,
the director of the Student Union was an OSU employee, and the
SUAB name was on the advertisements for the film.121 Thus, the
group’s showing of the film constituted school-sponsored speech
and the university’s decision to prevent the group from screening
the film was a lawful regulation reasonably related to the university’s legitimate pedagogical concern as to whether it wanted to endorse the content of such a controversial film.122
In Axson-Flynn v. Johnson,123 the Tenth Circuit again applied
Hazelwood, this time to a case brought against the University of
Utah by a student in the university’s Actor Training Program.124
The student claimed that the university compelled her to speak in
violation of her First Amendment rights by requiring her to utter
certain offensive words when performing a script.125 Faculty members in the acting program told the student126 to “get over” her
116. Id. at 1347.
117. See id.
118. 44 F.3d 847 (10th Cir. 1994).
119. See id. at 849.
120. See id. at 853.
121. See id. at 852.
122. See id.
123. 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004).
124. See id. at 1280.
125. See id.
126. The student’s refusal to swear or take God’s name in vain stemmed from her
religious beliefs as a member of the Church of Latter Day Saints. See id. at 1281.
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refusal to say the word “fuck” or take God’s name in vain during
classroom acting exercises when the script for the performance
called for such language.127 The court looked to Hazelwood and
found the acting program to be a non-public forum, “meaning that
school officials could regulate the speech that takes place there ‘in
any reasonable manner.’”128 Further, the court found that the expression involved in the acting program was “school-sponsored
speech,” and professors have a legitimate pedagogical concern in
limiting speech within a curriculum.129 Finally, the court held that
when a teacher gives an assignment a student has no constitutional
right to change that assignment or receive credit for something
other than what the professor assigned.130
In Brown v. Li,131 the Ninth Circuit applied Hazelwood where a
graduate student at the University of California at Santa Barbara
alleged the university violated his First Amendment right by refusing to accept his graduate thesis due to the inclusion of a “Disacknowledgements” section.132 The court found that Hazelwood
appropriately deferred “to the university’s expertise in defining academic standards and teaching students to meet them.”133 Therefore, the court upheld the university’s refusal to accept the
student’s thesis, finding that the thesis was school-sponsored
speech and that the university’s finding that the “Disacknowledgments” section of the thesis failed to comply with professional standards was a reasonable pedagogically-oriented regulation.134
In Flint v. Dennison,135 the Ninth Circuit upheld the right of the
University of Montana to impose a dollar limit on what students
127. See id. at 1280.
128. Id. at 1285 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270
(1988)).
129. See id.
130. See id. at 1287. The court also noted that substantial deference is given to
educators’ stated pedagogical concerns. Id. The Axson-Flynn court, in reaching this
decision, cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the
University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995), for the proposition that “[w]hen the
University determines the content of the education it provides, [it is] permitted . . . to
regulate the content of what is or is not expressed.” Id. at 1290.
131. 308 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002).
132. See id. at 952. This section of the thesis, using profane language, mockingly
“thanked” the Dean and staff of the university’s graduate school, former California
Governor Wilson, the Regents of the University of California, and “science” for “having been particularly obstructive” to his progress toward his graduate degree. Id.
133. Id.
134. See id.
135. 488 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 2007).
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may spend on their campaigns for student office.136 While the
court did not explicitly rely on Hazelwood, it noted that Hazelwood reinforced the conclusion that the university campaign expenditure limitations must be analyzed within a traditional forum
analysis.137 Applying the forum analysis, the court held that student elections at the university constituted a limited public forum
that provided an invaluable educational opportunity for students to
develop leadership and political skills.138 Within such an educational context the expenditure limitations, which did not affect how
a student’s campaign funds could be spent, were reasonable regulations designed to limit the use of the forum to its intended purposes.139 In other words, the court held that the spending
limitations were vital to maintaining the character of the student
election process as an educational tool, rather than as an ordinary
political exercise.140
In Hosty v. Carter,141 editors of Governors State University’s student newspaper claimed that the university engaged in prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment when the university
told the newspaper’s printer not to print any issues that the dean of
student affairs had not reviewed and approved in advance.142 The
Seventh Circuit applied Hazelwood and undertook a forum analysis but could not determine from the record exactly what type of
forum the student newspaper constituted.143 Noting that there is
no sharp difference between high school and college papers, the
court found it clear that the newspaper did not operate in a tradi136. See id. at 820.
137. See id. at 829.
138. See id. at 820.
139. See id. at 820, 833-36.
140. See id. at 835 (finding that the “ ‘primary intent’ of the spending limits [was] ‘to
prevent student government’s being diverted by interests other than ones educational,’ ” and that it was “obvious that the purpose of imposing the spending limit on
student candidates [was] to serve pedagogical interests in educating student leaders at
the University”).
141. 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005).
142. See id. at 733.
143. See id. at 734. In deciding to apply Hazelwood in the university context, the
court discussed the significance of footnote seven in the Supreme Court’s Hazelwood
decision. The court explained:
[T]his footnote does not even hint at the possibility of an on/off switch: high
school papers reviewable, college papers not reviewable. . . . Whether . . .
review is possible depends on the answer to the public-forum question,
which does not (automatically) vary with age. Only when courts need assess
the reasonableness of the asserted pedagogical justification . . . does age
come into play.
Id.
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tional public forum, as it was subsidized by the university.144 Citing
Hazelwood’s principle that “[w]hen a school regulates speech for
which it also pays . . . the appropriate question is whether the
[school’s] actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns,” the court posited that the university’s subsidization of
the paper could have created a limited public forum, thus allowing
the university to regulate the newspaper to preserve the forum’s
intended use.145 The court determined that the dean was entitled
to qualified immunity in her demand for review before the university would pay the newspaper’s printing fees,146 so the issue of the
type of forum the student newspaper constituted was left
unresolved.
In Kincaid v. Gibson,147 the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, struck
down Kentucky State University’s (“KSU”) confiscation and ban
of the university’s student yearbook.148 The university’s vice president for student affairs objected to a student editor’s organization
of the university yearbook for the 1993-1994 academic year, finding
the publication inappropriate and of poor quality.149 After consulting with the university president, the vice president for student affairs confiscated the yearbooks and withheld them from the
campus community.150 While the court found that Hazelwood did
not control the case, it noted that Hazelwood applied marginally
insofar as the Supreme Court applied a forum analysis to decide
the case.151 Applying the forum doctrine, the court held that the
yearbook was a limited public forum and the university “may impose only reasonable time, place, and manner regulations, and content-based regulations that are narrowly drawn to effectuate a
144. See id. at 737.
145. See id.
146. The uncertainty of whether Hazelwood applied to university expression in the
Seventh Circuit prior to this decision exempted the dean from personal liability, as it
would not be “clear to a reasonable [public official] that his conduct was unlawful in
the situation he confronted.” Id. at 738.
147. 236 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001).
148. See id. A panel from the same circuit had previously upheld the university
regulation, relying on Hazelwood in finding that the student yearbook a non-public
forum and that the university’s regulation of that forum was reasonable. See id. at
346.
149. The vice president objected to the editor’s attempt “to do something different,” which included giving the yearbook a theme of “destination unknown,” reflecting what the editor believed to be uncertainty KSU students felt, the high
unemployment rates, and a current controversy regarding whether KSU was going to
become a community college. See id. at 345.
150. See id.
151. See id. at 346 n.5.
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compelling state interest, on expressive activity in a limited public
forum.”152 The university’s confiscation of the yearbooks, which
lasted six years to the date of the en banc decision, was not a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction, nor was it narrowly
crafted, as the university allowed no alternative grounds for similar
expressive activity.153
B.

The First Circuit’s Refusal to Apply Hazelwood to
University Student Speech

Standing alone amongst these circuit opinions is Student Government Association v. Board of Trustees of the University of Massachusetts,154 in which the First Circuit heard a case brought against
the University of Massachusetts by students alleging that the university violated their free speech rights by abolishing the university’s Legal Services Organization, which the university established
to represent students and student organizations in litigation against
the university.155 The court found that Hazelwood’s forum analysis
did not apply to the case at hand because the Legal Services Organization was not a forum or channel of communication, but
merely a subsidy the university granted to students who elected to
use the court system.156 Accordingly, the court found that the university had not attempted to restrict the First Amendment rights of
students; rather, it had simply stopped subsidizing students’ use of
the courts.157
III.

SCHOLARLY REACTION TO THE APPLICATION
HAZELWOOD IN THE UNIVERSITY CONTEXT

OF

The scholarly response to the federal circuit courts’ application
of Hazelwood to university student speech has been abundant.158
Most scholars are critical of these circuit opinions, while others
have lauded the Sixth and First Circuits’ attempts at limiting or not
applying the Hazelwood framework.159 Others criticize the application of Hazelwood’s forum analysis to college student speech be152. Id. at 354.
153. See id.
154. 868 F.2d 473 (1st Cir. 1989).
155. See id.
156. See id. at 480 n.6.
157. See id. at 477.
158. See, e.g., supra note 22.
159. See Nimick, supra note 3, at 989-90 (lauding the First Circuit’s refusal to rely
on forum analysis in Student Gov’t Ass’n); Peltz, supra note 22, at 533 (praising the
Sixth Circuit’s decision in Kincaid for limiting the application of Hazelwood).

R
R
R
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cause it ignores important differences between colleges and high
schools160 and allows for viewpoint regulation.161 Several scholars
claim that the application of Hazelwood’s formula for regulation of
school-sponsored speech162 to college student speech is too restrictive and subjects virtually any university student expression to
regulation.163
160. The argument that the application of Hazelwood to college student speech
ignores the differences in maturity levels in college and high school students, and the
different missions of colleges and high schools, is echoed by numerous critics. See
Carter supra note 22, at 182; Finnigan supra note 13, at 1494-95; Golby supra note 22,
at 1280; Martin, supra note 22, at 195-97; Nimick, supra note 3, at 982-85; Ross, supra
note 22, at 737; Tenhoff, supra note 22, at 535.
161. The Supreme Court has long held that any regulation based on preference
among competing viewpoints is constitutionally suspect. See R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (finding the First Amendment does not permit a state
to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored
subjects). In public forum analysis, however, the Court has also consistently recognized a distinction between content discrimination and viewpoint discrimination. See
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828-30 (1995)
(highlighting the distinction between content discrimination, which is constitutionally
permissible if it preserves the purposes of a limited or non-public forum, and viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed impermissible when directed against speech
otherwise within the forum’s limitations). The critics cited in this Note argue that the
Hazelwood decision expanded the scope of permissible content discrimination to such
an extent that any distinction between content and viewpoint discrimination collapsed, and that administrators, therefore, now have the means to engage in virtually
any viewpoint discrimination. See Golby, supra note 22, at 1282 (criticizing the application of Hazelwood in the college context because the Supreme Court’s forum analysis in that case did not mention any prohibition of viewpoint discrimination, thus
permitting courts in subsequent cases to conclude it is permissible); Jordan, supra
note 22, at 1566-67 (finding that “a fair reading of Hazelwood suggests that the Supreme Court intended that some viewpoint-based restrictions of school-sponsored
speech would be permissible,” due to the absence of any viewpoint-neutrality requirement in the Hazelwood decision itself and due to the ability of viewpoint restrictions
to be disguised as a school’s attempt to define and preserve the scope of a limited or
non-pubic forum); Peltz, supra note 22, at 507-08 (finding that traditionally impermissible viewpoint discrimination may be camouflaged as permissible content discrimination, and that since Hazelwood, courts have disregarded the viewpoint discrimination
prong of the non-public forum analysis when evaluating student claims of First
Amendment violations); Wright, supra note 22, at 195 (finding, in post-Hazelwood
applications of the forum doctrine to universities, “what might otherwise be thought
of as a fatally viewpoint-based restriction on speech may be sanitized and excused if
the ‘viewpoint’ can instead be described as part of the unstated definition, scope, and
limits of the forum”).
162. This formula posits that if the school speaks on its own behalf, if it sponsors
speech, or if students, parents, or members of the community could reasonably believe the school has sponsored speech, the school can regulate the speech so long as
the regulation reasonably relates to the school’s legitimate pedagogical concerns. See
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); supra Part I.C.
163. See Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 742 (9th Cir. 2007) (Evans, J., dissenting)
(“The majority’s holding . . . is particularly unfortunate considering the manner in
which Hazelwood has been used in the high school setting to restrict controversial
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A consistent theme throughout these criticisms, though, is the
claim that the circuit opinions applying Hazelwood to student expression in the university are flawed because they ignore Supreme
Court precedent that specifically protects student speech rights in
the university.164 In support of this claim, scholars repeatedly invoke the Supreme Court’s decisions in Healy v. James165 and Papish v. Board of Curators of the University of Missouri166 for the
principle that the university is the quintessential marketplace of
ideas and the First Amendment rights of college students are the
same as those of the public in general.167 In Healy, the Court held
speech.”); Golby, supra note 22, at 1279 (criticizing the application of Hazelwood’s
public forum doctrine to the college context because it places too much control over
expression in the hands of school administrators); Jordan, supra note 22, at 1568 (finding that in the post-Hazelwood era, “courts have accepted very broad definitions of
school-sponsored speech and legitimate pedagogical concerns, and have deferred to a
school’s identification of both,” and that “these developments indicate a troubling
lack of protection for student expression”); Merritt, supra note 22, at 493-94 (claiming
that to see how applications of Hazelwood could affect student expression at colleges
and universities, one only needs to look at how Hazelwood has affected student expression in secondary education, where administrators have been permitted to control
a wide range of student expression and have been given broad deference in deciding
what constitutes a legitimate pedagogical concern, and pointing to a California State
University system memorandum to university presidents suggesting that they might
have more authority than previously thought to control student speech); Nimick,
supra note 3, at 994-95 (finding that since Hazelwood, high school administrators have
been granted broad authority to regulate and, to some extent, dictate student speech,
and that an expansion of Hazelwood would inevitably chill all speech on university
campuses and effectively defeat the notion of the university as a quintessential marketplace of ideas); Peltz, supra note 22, at 496-509 (documenting the “profound and
immediate” increase in incidences of censorship after Hazelwood and noting that
there is no reason to expect college administrators to respond differently if Hazelwood is held to govern regulations of college student speech); Ross, supra note 22, at
739 (claiming that application of Hazelwood to the expression of college students is
problematic because “[a]fter Hazelwood, high school principals had ‘nearly unbridled
discretion’ to control student media,” and “Hazelwood’s devastating impact on high
school students’ [free speech rights] might be replicated on college campuses” (quoting Hosty, 412 F.3d at 742 (Evans, J., dissenting))).
164. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
165. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
166. 410 U.S. 667 (1973).
167. See Finnigan, supra note 13, at 1482 (claiming Healy and Papish “sent a clear
message that the First Amendment could not be avoided or watered down in the
university context”); Golby, supra note 22, at 1266 (noting Healy and Papish stand for
the proposition that First Amendment protections apply with the same force on college campuses as they do in the community at large); Merritt, supra note 22, at 479
(finding Healy and Papish give college students the same First Amendment rights as
independent adults); Nimick, supra note 3, at 960 (“Unlike Hazelwood, [Healy and
Papish] stood for the proposition that the First Amendment should apply with equal
force, both on and off campus. . . . [The Court] held university officials to a much
more strict standard than that articulated in Hazelwood.”); Peltz, supra note 22, at 510
(“Before Hazelwood the Supreme Court had held unequivocally that ‘the precedents
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that a university could not deny recognition to a student group on
the grounds that the group’s leftist, potentially radical philosophy168 was adverse to the university’s policies, as it was constitutionally impermissible under the First Amendment.169 In Papish,
the Court held that a university’s expulsion of a student for distributing a newspaper containing offensive material on campus was a
violation of the student’s First Amendment rights.170 In both of
these decisions, the Court relied on the principles that the First
Amendment rights of students were largely coextensive with those
of the public at large171 and that regulation of the “mere dissemination of ideas” due to disagreement with those ideas does not comport with those rights.172
Critics have taken these principles to mean that the application
of Hazelwood to colleges represents a shift in the treatment of college student speech due to the application of a public forum analysis, the higher degree of deference given to university
regulations,173 and the ignorance of the Court’s different treatment
of high school and college students when assessing constitutional
rights.174 While the application of Hazelwood to the university
of this Court leave no room for the view that . . . First Amendment protections should
apply with less force on college campuses than in the community at large.’ ” (quoting
Healy, 408 U.S. at 180)).
168. The group was part of a larger national student movement during the 1960’s
and 1970’s that used civil disobedience, seizure of buildings, vandalism, and arson on
some campuses to “bring about constructive changes.” See Healy, 408 U.S. at 171-72.
169. See id. at 191; supra Part I.A.
170. See Papish, 410 U.S. at 667; supra Part I.A.
171. See Healy, 408 U.S. at 180.
172. See Papish, 410 U.S. at 670-71.
173. See Golby, supra note 22, at 1266; see also Finnigan, supra note 13, at 1489
(claiming that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Healy and Papish set down a clear
rule in favor of students in cases of university censorship and that Hazelwood altered
a substantial body of precedent granting college students First Amendment protections on par with those outside the university); Jordan, supra note 22, at 1566 (positing
that Hazelwood can be seen as a shift in the Supreme Court’s attitude toward regulation of student speech because it allows for the permissibility of viewpoint discrimination); Merritt, supra note 22, at 479-81 (citing the Supreme Court opinions in Healy
and Papish to highlight the Court’s recognition of students’ autonomy within the university and the broad protection afforded student expression on campuses, and claiming that when Hazelwood was decided it was thought unlikely to ever be applied in
the college and university setting); Nimick, supra note 3, at 961-64 (arguing that applying Hazelwood to student speech in the university overrules more than thirty years
of First Amendment jurisprudence and that, in Healy and Papish, the Court held university officials to a much stricter standard when regulating student speech than in
Hazelwood).
174. See Golby, supra note 22, at 1280 (discussing how the Supreme Court has consistently treated children and adults differently in a variety of areas, including in high
school and college contexts); Nimick, supra note 3, at 982-83 (claiming the Supreme
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context departs significantly from the analysis in Healy and Papish,
this criticism ignores that several years before Hazelwood was decided, starting with Widmar v. Vincent,175 the Supreme Court abandoned the analysis used in these early cases and applied a test
virtually the same as that used in Hazelwood to college student
speech.
IV. MISPLACED CRITICISM: HAZELWOOD HAS NOT BEEN
WRONGLY APPLIED TO COLLEGE STUDENT SPEECH IN LIGHT OF
THE SUPREME COURT’S RECENT RULINGS
The circuit court decisions discussed in Part II.A may create bad
policy because they recognize greater restrictions on free speech in
colleges and universities than most free speech advocates would
tolerate. A common criticism is that these cases wrongly ignore
the differences between high school and college students and discard the notion that the university is the typical marketplace of
ideas in today’s society.176 If scholars wish to criticize these restrictions, however, they must criticize the Supreme Court’s treatment
of college student speech, not just the recent circuit court decisions
that applied Hazelwood to college speech, because those appellate
decisions do not significantly depart from the Supreme Court’s
framework for evaluating the First Amendment rights of college
students. Those critics who claim that they do depart from Supreme Court precedent177 ignore that the Court has always recognized universities’ substantial power to regulate students and that
its recent college speech opinions have consistently applied a public forum analysis and given great deference to universities’ autonomous decision-making authority.178 While the Court has indeed
recognized that the university is the archetypal marketplace of
Court has regularly highlighted the importance of the distinction between high school
students, who are mostly minors, and college students, who are almost exclusively
adults); see also Finnigan supra note 13, at 1494 (citing Healy as evidence that courts
have consistently recognized the distinction in the relative age differences between
high school and college students).
175. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
176. See supra notes 160-63.
177. See supra notes 26, 167, 173-74 and accompanying text.
178. When these arguments are not outright ignored, there is tendency to simply
mention that there is Supreme Court precedent that supports the application of Hazelwood’s principles to the university and subsequently ignore it. See, e.g., Golby,
supra note 22, at 1285 (mentioning in one sentence, at the very end of the article, that
there is “Supreme Court precedent suggesting that the public forum analysis is the
proper framework for scrutinizing student speech at universities”).
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ideas,179 the Court’s contemporary university speech jurisprudence
has provided support for the post-Hazelwood university free
speech decisions.
A. Since Healy and Papish, the Court Has Consistently
Applied a Forum Analysis to Student Speech in the University
While the restrictive standards of Hazelwood would likely not
withstand scrutiny under the speech-protective rhetoric of Healy
and Papish,180 scholars who criticize the application of Hazelwood
to universities completely ignore the Supreme Court’s later college
179. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972).
180. Healy and Papish may actually lend support to universities’ current regulatory
power. Despite broad language, Healy and Papish do recognize substantial power of
universities to regulate speech. In Healy, a case repeatedly cited for the recognition
that the university is the quintessential marketplace of ideas and for the broad free
speech rights of college students, see supra note 167, the Court embraced several principles that limited that recognition. The Court found that universities have a legitimate interest in preventing disruption on campus. See Healy, 408 U.S. at 189.
Further, it held that circumstances requiring the safeguarding of that interest may
justify restraint of speech, including the prohibition of associational activities “where
they infringe reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes, or substantially interfere with
the opportunity of other students to obtain an education.” Id. In addition to recognizing “the College administration’s broad rulemaking power to assure that the traditional academic atmosphere is safeguarded,” id. at 194 n.24, the Court also recognized
the ability of the university to impose sanctions on those who violate the rules. See
id.; see also id. at 192 (“We . . . hold that a college has the inherent power to promulgate rules and regulations; that it has the inherent power to properly discipline . . . .”).
The Court drew a line between advocacy and action and highlighted the ability of
universities to regulate conduct, as opposed to mere expression, see id. at 192, but the
Court also established that a university has broad power to enact reasonable campus
regulations to preserve its unique educational environment. Even under Healy this
principle, coupled with the principle that any constitutional distinction between
speech and conduct is specious, see Louis Henkin, Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82
HARV. L. REV. 63, 79-80 (1968) (describing the largely untenable distinction between
conduct and expression, and noting several instances of the Court’s recognition of this
notion), illustrates that the Court believes that universities have the ability to regulate
certain forms of expression. As an extreme example, a university could regulate a
student group that burned a flag on the university quad, while classes were in progress, in protest of American foreign policy. Under Healy, the flag-burning could
catch the attention of those students in class, or on the way to class, arguably distracting students or making them late to class, thus interrupting class or interfering with
others’ opportunity to obtain an education.
While Papish is consistently cited along with Healy by critics, it was a short per
curiam opinion that added nothing new to the Court’s university speech jurisprudence, but merely echoed the principles articulated in Healy. See Papish v. Bd. of
Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 667 (1973). The Papish Court reaffirmed
that universities do not have the power to regulate expression simply because they
disagree with it, but can enact reasonable regulations of student speech and conduct
in order to maintain the educational environment. See id. at 670.
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student speech opinions.181 This oversight, intentional or not, is
significant because one of the main criticisms of the federal circuit
courts’ recent college student speech decisions is that the application of Hazelwood’s forum analysis is too restrictive of student
speech and allows the university too much power to regulate a
broad array of student speech.182 The problem with this argument
is that the Court applied a forum analysis to college student speech
and concluded that the university is not a public forum long before
the Hazelwood litigation began.183
In the 1981 case of Widmar v. Vincent,184 the Court broke from
its recognition of broad student speech rights illustrated in Healy
and Papish, and applied the same forum analysis applied in Hazelwood to university student speech.185 The Court ultimately ruled
for the students, concluding that a university could not exclude a
religious student group from premises it had opened for use by all
other non-religious campus groups.186 The Court also found that a
university was not a traditional public forum, noting that a university differs in significant respects from public forums such as streets
or parks or even municipal theaters.187 Widmar thus marked the
beginning of the Court’s use of a forum analysis as the framework
for evaluating college student speech issues. The Court recognized
that universities are limited forums and that they have attendant
power to impose “reasonable regulations compatible with [their

181. Some articles cite the Supreme Court’s later college student speech decisions,
but they do not analyze them in any meaningful way. The opinions are merely cited
for the specific decision that was rendered, which, as noted above, all upheld the free
speech rights of students in the face of attempted university regulation, see supra note
12 and accompanying text, without any acknowledgement that the Court applied a
forum analysis, found the university not to be a traditional public forum, and recognized substantial deference to the university’s autonomy in regulating itself. See Merritt, supra note 22, at 482 (citing Rosenberger v. University of Virgina, 515 U.S. 819,
829 (1995), and Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin v. Southworth, 529
U.S. 217 (2000), for the proposition that after Hazelwood the Court has continued to
protect college and university student speech, but nowhere acknowledging the Court’s
use of a forum analysis); Nimick, supra note 3, at 965-66 (discussing briefly Rosenberger and Southworth, but never mentioning the forum analysis and selectively quoting
principles conveying broad student speech rights).
182. See supra notes 160-163 and accompanying text.
183. The controversy that gave rise to the Hazelwood suit occurred in May of 1983.
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262 (1988).
184. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
185. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
186. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277.
187. See id. at 268 n.5.
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educational] mission upon the use of [their] campus and
facilities.”188
In Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia,189 the Court furthered the forum analysis that was applied in
Widmar.190 The Court found that the denial of university funding
to a Christian student group amounted to viewpoint discrimination
in violation of the First Amendment. The Court, however, renewed its contention that the university is a limited forum,191 noting explicitly that “[t]he necessities of confining a forum to the
limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created may justify
the [university] in reserving it for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics.”192 Thus, the Court legitimated the ability of
the university to engage in content discrimination when the purpose is to preserve the forums it creates.193
The Court’s most recent college student speech case enunciated
several principles that further legitimize the notion that the Court
is sympathetic to, or at least neutral towards, the subsequent federal circuit court applications of Hazelwood to student speech in
universities. In Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin
System v. Southworth,194 the Court again applied a forum analysis
to the student speech at issue, and found that students who contributed to the university’s mandatory student activity fund had no
right to object to the university’s funding of groups whose ideas
they may find disagreeable.195 The Court found that the purpose
of the mandatory activity fee was to create a forum open to a wide
variety of viewpoints.196 The Court, however, tempered this finding by claiming that “[i]t is not for the [courts] to say what is or is
not germane to the ideas . . . pursued in [a university forum].”197 If
a university decided that its interests were better served by some
188. Id.
189. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
190. See supra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
191. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
192. Id.
193. See id. (noting the “distinction between . . . content discrimination, which may
be permissible if it preserves the purposes of that limited forum, and . . . viewpoint
discrimination, which is presumed impermissible when directed against speech otherwise within the forum’s limitations”); cf. supra note 52-57 and accompanying text.
194. 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
195. See id. at 221; supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
196. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 232.
197. Id.
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other type of system (other than a system open to diverse viewpoints), it would be free to implement that system.198
The Court held that the university “may determine that its mission is well served” by allowing students “to engage in dynamic
discussion of philosophical, religious, scientific, social, and political
subjects in . . . extracurricular campus life.”199 If a university
reaches this conclusion, it may impose means to sustain that end.
It follows that the university may also determine that its mission is
not well served by such dynamic discussion and, if so, the university
may take measures (i.e. regulations of expression) to sustain
whatever other ends, aside from dynamic discussion, it chooses.
The Court thus exhibited great deference to universities’ self-regulation and supported universities’ broad power to decide what kind
of expression is allowed on their campuses.200
B.

The Circuit Courts Are Justified in Applying Hazelwood in
the University Context

The Supreme Court has consistently recognized the principles
contained within the Hazelwood framework and applied them
without fail to student speech in the university context. The
Court’s decisions in Widmar, Rosenberger, and Southworth illustrate: (1) the application of a forum analysis to university student
speech, (2) the recognition that the university is not a public forum,
and (3) the understanding that courts largely defer to the regulatory decisions schools make for themselves. All of these principles
are utilized by the federal circuits in applying Hazelwood. Criti198. See id.
199. Id. at 233.
200. It is also interesting to note that, in concurring with the Court’s decision in
Southworth, Justices Souter, Stevens, and Breyer cited the same case as the Eleventh,
Tenth, Ninth, and Seventh Circuits for the premise that courts should give great deference to autonomous decisionmaking by the academy itself. The concurring justices in
Southworth cite Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (1985)
for the proposition that courts should be reluctant to intrude upon the prerogatives of
educational institutions because “ ‘[a]cademic freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students, but also,
and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous decisionmaking [sic] by the academy
itself.” Southworth, 529 U.S. at 237 (Souter, J., concurring). In their applications of
Hazelwood to college student speech, the Eleventh, Tenth, Ninth, and Seventh Circuits cite Ewing for the idea that great deference should be given by federal courts to
autonomous decisionmaking by the academy itself. See Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731,
736 (7th Cir. 2005); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1293 n.14 (10th Cir. 2004);
Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 951 (9th Cir. 2002); Ala. Student Party v. Student Gov’t
Ass’n of the Univ. of Ala., 867 F.2d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 1989).
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cisms of those decisions,201 namely, those criticisms that argue that
the application of a forum analysis to college student speech is too
restrictive because it allows for viewpoint regulation and potentially subjects any student expression in the university to regulation,202 can be levied at the Court’s invocation of these principles.
Accordingly, the courts of appeals are justified in applying Hazelwood to college student speech.
The major difference between the federal appellate decisions
discussed in Part II.A and the Supreme Court decisions in Widmar,
Rosenberger, and Southworth is the circuit courts’ application of
Hazelwood’s school-sponsored speech rationale.203 Essentially, the
application of this rationale to college student speech has effectively done what the Supreme Court, in Widmar, Rosenberger, and
Southworth, refused to do: found that school “sponsorship,” via
subsidization of speech activities, allows the university to regulate
the content of its own speech.204 What this indicates is not that the
circuit courts are applying a different test to college student speech,
as compared to the Supreme Court’s decisions in this area,205 but
that, in their application of Hazelwood, they have gone from a primarily forum-based analysis of student speech (as exemplified in
Widmar, Rosenberger, and Southworth)206 to a “government
speech”-based analysis.207
This government speech rationale was acknowledged in Widmar,
Rosenberger, and Southworth,208 but the Court found that the facts
of these cases did not support an analysis based on the government, or university, regulating its own speech (or “speech for
201. See supra Part II for analysis of the circuit courts’ application of Hazelwood in
the university context.
202. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
203. For an explanation of the “school-sponsored speech” rationale, see Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (“[E]ducators do not offend the
First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”).
204. Compare supra Part II.A, with supra notes 77-95 and accompanying text.
205. See supra Parts I.A-B.
206. See supra notes 58-67, 71-74, 77-84, 88-93 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 75-76. For the best summary of this analysis, see Rosenberger
v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (“When
the University determines the content of the education it provides, it is the University
speaking, and we have permitted the government to regulate the content of what is or
is not expressed when it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities to convey its
own message.”).
208. See supra notes 75-81, 89 and accompanying text. The university in Southworth specifically disclaimed that the speech at issue was its own. See Bd. of Regents
of the Univ. of Wisc. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000).
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which it also pays”209). Unlike the Court, however, the circuit
courts—the First Circuit aside210—have been willing to look at the
facts of college student speech cases and to determine that, through
the university’s subsidization of student speech activities, the
speech at issue was the university’s own speech and recognition
need be given to a university’s right to control the content of its
own speech.211 Thus, in their application of Hazelwood, the circuit
courts have used the same framework used by the Supreme Court
in Widmar, Rosenberger, and Southworth and have simply reached
different conclusions.212
This is furthered by the fact that the Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to grant certiorari to “controversial” cases applying
Hazelwood to student speech in the university.213 If the Court
thought the circuits were applying the wrong standard, they would
have granted certiorari in those cases and corrected them.
It is immaterial that the Court has ultimately upheld student
speech rights in its decisions because the Court’s rationale justifies
the application of Hazelwood to college student speech. The
Court’s ratio decidendi in each university speech case since 1981
has de facto applied the same test used by the circuit courts in their
application of Hazelwood to college student speech.214 Simply because the Court found that the university regulations involved in
each case where a forum analysis was applied were unconstitutionally restrictive of student speech, it does not automatically follow
that this must always be the case. The Court recognized that where
a limited or non-public forum is found, or where a university spon209. See Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 2005).
210. See Student Gov’t Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 773 (1st
Cir. 1989).
211. See Hosty, 412 F.3d at 737; Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1285 (10th
Cir. 2004); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 952 (9th Cir. 2002); Cummins v. Campbell, 44
F.3d 847, 852 (10th Cir. 1994); Ala. Student Party v. Student Gov’t Ass’n of the Univ.
of Ala., 867 F.2d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 1989).
212. See discussion supra Part II.A. The Supreme Court in Rosenberger, citing Hazelwood itself, noted that when the university determines the content of the education
it provides, or when it subsidizes speech, the university is speaking and can regulate
the content, and even viewpoint, of what is or is not expressed. See Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995). Therefore, the Court
acknowledged the application of Hazelwood’s principle that when a university speaks
or sponsors speech (i.e., when speech bears the imprimatur of the university, see Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271(1988)), the university can regulate
the expression. Even though the Court did not find that the university was speaking
or sponsoring speech in Rosenberger, other courts are not prohibited from finding
otherwise in different cases.
213. See Hosty v. Carter, 546 U.S. 1169 (2006); Brown v. Li, 538 U.S. 908 (2003).
214. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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sors speech, certain regulations of student expression will be upheld.215 Conversely, just because most circuit courts have upheld
university regulations of student speech in their application of the
forum analysis does not mean this must always be the case. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit’s decision to strike down a university’s confiscation and ban on a student yearbook is a shining example of
student speech being upheld in light of a court’s application of a
forum analysis.216
CONCLUSION
The application of the Supreme Court’s decision in Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier by the federal courts of appeals to student speech in colleges and universities gives broad power to those
institutions to regulate what is or is not said within their confines.217 As argued in this Note, these applications are firmly
grounded in the Supreme Court’s recent university speech decisions.218 Therefore the case law, at least in the Sixth, Seventh,
Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, is unlikely to change anytime
soon. In light of the similar forum analyses and government
speech tests applied by the circuit courts and the Supreme Court,
those circuits which have yet to address a post-Hazelwood college
student speech issue219 will likely apply Hazelwood’s principles,
and those echoed in recent college speech Supreme Court
decisions.220
Scholars, students, and proponents of free speech should never
give up their fight and should continue to petition the courts if they
seek greater college student speech rights or redress of university
censorship. In practice, however, if they disagree with the limitations placed on speech of college students and the regulatory
power given to universities through the application of Hazelwood
to college speech issues, their efforts need also be directed elsewhere. Aim could be taken, for example, at educating the student
body on university campuses of the value of free speech and re215. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
216. See Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 354 (6th Cir. 2001).
217. See discussion supra Parts II.A, III and accompanying text.
218. See supra Part IV and accompanying text.
219. The Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits have yet to hear a case
directly concerning the issue of college student speech since the Supreme Court’s decision in Hazelwood.
220. See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217
(2000); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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educating university administrators as to the university’s purpose
and place as “peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’”221 Legislation
protecting students’ free speech rights is another option,222 one
proposed and already adopted in many jurisdictions, for better or
worse.223 These efforts are likely to be more successful than looking to the courts to change the existing law.

221. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972); see, e.g., Merritt, supra note 22, at
495-96 (proposing that students encourage “college and university leaders to sign
pledges recognizing that they intend to let campus media exist without any influence
or control of the school”).
222. Indeed, the Supreme Court, in Southworth, hinted that this may be an answer
to discontent with subsequent judicial application of the school-sponsored speech rationale. The Court said that when the government, or in this case, the university,
speaks or sponsors speech, “it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate and the
political process for its advocacy.” Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000).
223. See generally Ross, supra note 22 (analyzing California Educational Code section 66301, which prohibits public colleges from imposing disciplinary sanctions on
students for speech or other expression that would be protected by the First Amendment outside the school, and California’s Leonard Law, which extends section 66301
to private colleges); Sanders, supra note 22 (examining why “anti-Hazelwood statutes
are the most effective and sensible way to stave off” the negative effects of the application of Hazelwood to universities and suggesting a model law). But see Cheryl A.
Cameron et al., Academic Bills of Rights: Conflict in the Classroom, 31 J.C. & U.L.
243 (evaluating federal and state attempts at student free speech legislation and warning advocates of such legislation that taking authority to control the classroom away
from professional educators and putting it into the hands of the government and politics may not be the best course of action).
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